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Abstract 
This paper examines the causes of conflict in Burundi and discusses strategies for 
building peace.  The analysis of the complex relationships between distribution and 
group dynamics reveals that these relationships are reciprocal, implying that distribution 
and group dynamics are endogenous.  The nature of endogenously generated group 
dynamics determines the type of preferences (altruistic or exclusionist), which in turn 
determines the type of allocative institutions and policies that prevail in the political and 
economic system.  While unequal distribution of resources may be socially inefficient, it 
nonetheless can be rational from the perspective of the ruling elite, especially because 
inequality perpetuates dominance.  However, because unequal distribution of resources 
generates conflict, maintaining a system based on inequality is difficult because it 
requires ever increasing investments in repression.  It is therefore clear that if the new 
Burundian leadership is serious about building peace, it must engineer institutions that 
uproot the legacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunity for social mobility for 
all members of ethnic groups and regions. 
 
 
                                                 
* Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the UNU/WIDER conference on “Making Peace Work”, 
Helsinki, Finland, June 4-5, 2004, and at the Five-College African Studies Council on December 9, 2004.  
The author is grateful for constructive comments from participants to seminars where this paper was 
presented.  Special thanks go to Ralph Faulkingham, Frank Holmquist, and David Newburry in the Five-
College African Studies Council. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the past decade, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered a disproportionate share of civil wars and 
peace in conflict-affected countries has been fragile and short lived (Bigombe, Collier and 
Sambanis 2000).  Countries fall back into civil war when the end of conflict is not accompanied 
by strategies explicitly aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict.   
 
In the case of Burundi, we argue that civil wars arise from distributional conflict and that 
achieving political stability will require the establishment of institutional mechanisms that 
correct the legacy of inequality in access to economic and political power across ethnic groups 
and regions.  This argument is based on an analysis of the complex relationships between 
distribution and group dynamics.  The relation between distribution and group dynamics is 
reciprocal, implying that distribution and group dynamics are endogenous.   
 
Distribution of economic resources and political power may be equal or unequal.  Equal 
distribution of resources promotes cohesive group dynamics while unequal distribution creates 
antagonism between the privileged groups and the marginalized ones.  In turn, the nature of 
endogenously generated group dynamics determines the type of preferences which may be 
altruistic or exclusionist.  These preferences in turn determine the type of allocative institutions 
and policies that prevail in the political and economic system.  Altruistic preferences promote 
egalitarian and nationalistic policies while exclusionist preferences induce sectarian and 
inegalitarian allocative policies.  Hence the distribution of national resources (economic 
resources and political power) is endogenous in the sense that equality or inequality arise from 
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the type of allocative policies that prevail in the system.  These relationships are summarized in 
Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Group dynamics and distributional conflict 
 
 
It also follows from the foregoing analysis that while unequal distribution of resources may be 
socially inefficient, it nonetheless can be “rational” from the perspective of the ruling elite, 
especially because inequality perpetuates dominance.  For example, the concentration of 
education infrastructure in the southern province of Bururi in Burundi led to sub-optimal human 
capital development (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000; Jackson 2000).  Yet this policy was a vital 
mechanism of consolidation of power for the southern Tutsi oligarchy.  Obviously, because of 
the conflict that unequal distribution generates, systems based on inequality are difficult to 
sustain in the long run as they require ever increasing investments in repression. 
 
This analysis has important implications for our understanding of the causes of civil wars in 
Burundi and the strategies to achieve peace.  First, the analysis helps to clear an important 
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confusion that has always plagued the analysis of civil wars in Burundi (and Rwanda for that 
matter); that is, the conflation of two distinct phenomena, namely the existence of ethnic groups 
and antagonism between ethnic groups.  Our analysis considers the existence of distinguished 
ethnic groups in Burundi as a matter of historical fact.2  In contrast, we argue, ethnic antagonism 
is an acquired phenomenon, arising from biased distribution of economic resources and political 
power.  This analysis shifts the focus from ethnicity per se to distribution as a primary cause of 
civil wars.   
 
Secondly and most importantly, by shifting the attention to distribution, the analysis generates 
useful insights about strategies for building lasting peace in the post-conflict era.  The analysis 
suggests that emphasis should be on policies that alleviate inequality across ethnic groups and 
regions while promoting institutional accountability.  It becomes clear then that while democracy 
is the necessary route to stability, simply replacing one ethnic group by another in the political 
hierarchy through blind democratic calculus is not a viable long-term solution to civil wars.  This 
is to say that institutional reform will not end with the simple establishment of a western-style 
democratic system.  Such a system can in fact be counterproductive if it results in the 
institutionalization of ethnic dominance, regional inequality, or any other form of bias in the 
economic and political arenas. 
 
This paper reviews the evidence in the literature on the causes of conflict in Burundi with the 
aim of examining the role of distribution in generating conflict.  We illustrate the distributional 
                                                 
2 We do not discuss the issue of existence or nonexistence of ethnic groups in Burundi.  We find such an enterprise 
fundamentally futile for the purpose of explaining conflicts.  The relevant issue is not whether ethnic groups exist or 
not but why and how they arise in the complex interaction among multiple factors that cause conflict.  Ethnicity may 
be a contributor to conflict only if it instrumented for the purpose of controlling power and extracting the rents 
associated with monopolization of power  
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nature of conflict by examining the role of two key institutions that cemented inequality and 
exclusion in colonial and post-colonial regimes, namely the education system and the military.  
We examine the conflicts that plagued the post-independence era, namely the 1965 killings, 1972 
massacres, the 1988 uprising and killings, the rebel invasion of 1991, and the conflict that 
erupted at the assassination of the newly democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye in 
October 1993.  The analysis refers to four main historical eras, the pre-colonial and colonial eras, 
the reign of the monolithic military republics (1966-1993), and the post-1993 period. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the following section reviews the lessons from the 
literature on conflicts in Burundi and in Africa in general with an emphasis on the role of 
ethnicity, patrimonialism, predation, and institutional failure.  Section 3 discusses how civil wars 
in Burundi arise from distributional conflict.  Section 4 uses the lenses of distributional conflict 
to highlight the main economic and political problems that must be addressed in building lasting 
peace.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Explaining conflicts in Burundi: What have we learned? 
The role of ethnicity 
The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining conflict in Burundi has occupied a central 
place in the literature.  Conflicts in Burundi have often been characterized as clashes between 
two inherently antagonistic ethnic groups.  We argue that this characterization is fundamentally 
flawed and inconsistent with historical evidence. 
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In his influential book on conflict in Burundi, Lemarchand (1995) pointed out an important 
“paradox” in the history of Burundi.  He noted that uncharacteristically for a sub-Saharan 
African country, ethnic groups in Burundi have a long history of peaceful cohabitation, speaking 
the same language, sharing the same culture and having submitted to the same traditional 
monarchy.  However, in the end of the colonial era and throughout the independence era, the 
country experienced conflicts that, on the surface, opposed the Hutu to the Tutsi.  Given that the 
Hutu and the Tutsi have not always antagonized, the question we must ask is what happened 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods that generated violent conflicts along ethnic lines.   
 
Table 1: Ethnic origin of chiefs in Burundi, 1929-1945 
 
GANWA TUTSI HUTU TOTAL YEAR 
number % number % number % number % 
1929 76 57 30 23 27 20 133 100 
1933 36 78 7 15 3 7 46 100 
1937 35 80 8 18 1 2 44 100 
1945 25 71 10 29 0 0 35 100 
Source: Lemarchand, R. 1994. Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
One source of explanation for why conflict happened is the introduction of ethnicity as a 
primordial determinant of access to power starting from the colonial era.  The 1929 
reorganization of the territorial administration marked a turning point in the history of the 
country with regard to the role of ethnicity in politics.  The Belgian colonizers orchestrated an 
overhaul of the administration that resulted in the domination of the political system by chiefs 
from the Tutsi ethnic group (Table 1).  In 1929, 20 percent of the chiefs were Hutu but by 1945 
there were no Hutu chiefs in the administration.  This administrative reform marked the 
beginning of marginalization of the Hutu in politics.  Tutsi domination of the political system 
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continued since then and was consolidated especially after the 1972 massacres.  Table 2 
illustrates the evolution of domination of the government by the Tutsi.  The table also illustrates 
the volatility of the political system in the periods leading to and following independence, which 
resulted from both antagonism between the Hutu and Tutsi elites as well as factionalization 
within the Tutsi elite, especially between Bururi and Muramvya.3 
Table 2: Ethnic composition of governments in Burundi, 1961-1993 
 
Government head: name and 
ethnic origin 
Duration and fate of 
government head 
Number of 
Hutu 
Number of 
Tutsi 
Total 
Louis Rwagasore, PM, Ganwa 
 
2 weeks: September 1961-
October 1961 
(Assassinated) 
N/A N/A N/A 
André Muhirwa, PM, Tutsi 
 
18 months: October 1961-June 
1963 
(Resigned) 
4 (37%) 7 (63%) 11 
Pierre Ngendandumwe, PM, 
Hutu 
 
9 months: June 1963-March 
1964 
(Resigned) 
6 (46%) 7 (54%) 13 
Albin Nyamoya, PM, Tutsi 9 months: March 1964-January 
1965 
(Resigned) 
5 (38%) 8 (62%) 13 
Pierre Ngendandumwe, PM, 
Hutu 
1 week: 7-15 January 1965 
(Assassinated) 
6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15 
Joseph Bamina, PM, Hutu 8 months: January-September 
1965 
(Executed) 
6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15 
Leopold Bihumugani (Biha), 
PM, Tutsi 
14 months: September 1965 - 
November 1966 
(Arrested) 
6 (60%) 4 (40%) 10 
Michel Micombero, President, 
Tutsi 
10 years: December 1966-
November 1976 
(Overthrown) 
5 (36%) 9 (64%) 14 (December 
1966) 
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 
President, Tutsi 
10 years: November 1976-
September 1987  
(Overthrown) 
4 (20%) 16 (80%) 20 (November 
1976) 
Pierre Buyoya, President, 
Tutsi 
5 years: September 1987-July 
1993 
(lost in democratic elections) 
5 (26%) 14 (74%) 19  
(1987) 
Sources: Eggers, Ellen (1997) Historical Dictionary of Burundi.  Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.  Ntibazonkiza, 
Raphaël (1993) Au Royaume des Seigneurs de la Lance: Une Approche Historique de la Question Ethnique au 
Burundi, Tome 2. Bruxelles: Bruxelles-Droits de L’Homme. 
Note: PM = Prime Minister ; N/A = not available. 
 
                                                 
3 The Muramvya province was the historical headquarters of the kingdom.  Under the monarchy, the Tutsi from the 
Hima clan were considered an underclass within the Tutsi ethnic group.  Bururi contains a large proportion of Tutsi-
Hima, the clan of all the former military presidents (Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya). 
 7
Ethnic diversity is not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but ethnicity is intertwined with other 
political and regional factors in contributing to conflict.4  On the one hand, the Tutsi-Hima from 
the southern province of Bururi exploited ethnic identity to control power.  In turn, political 
entrepreneurs excluded from state spoils activated ethnic solidarities to challenge the regime in 
place.  Thus, ethnic diversity became an instrument for political competition in the pursuit of 
economic and political advantages.  It follows that conflicts are caused not by ethnic diversity 
per se but by inequality in the distribution of access to national resources and political power 
across ethnic groups.  When the political system discriminates along ethnic lines, then ethnicity 
becomes a vehicle of conflict.   
 
Patrimonialism, predation and institutional failure 
Under the pre-colonial era, leadership was surrounded by the mythical notion of divine power of 
the King.  The King was above the nation and just under god: “Imana, Umwami, Uburundi” 
(God, the King, and the nation) was the traditional order (Ngaruko 2003).  Everything belonged 
to the King, including material resources as well as the people.  This tradition established the 
notion that the King not only ruled the country but also owned the country and its resources.  A 
patrimonial system generates rents that accrue to only those who belong to the “clan” of leaders.  
The smaller the clan the larger the individual share in the rents.  Therefore, clan members have 
the incentives to erect barriers to entry into the club.   
                                                 
4  A similar conclusion has been reached in careful analyses of conflicts in neighboring Rwanda, including studies of 
the genocide, an event that has gained world attention and which has by and large been characterized as an ethnic 
war.  For example, Hintjens (1999: 248) concludes that genocide was not the outcome of “spontaneous outbursts of 
mutual antagonisms between ethnic groups.”  Fedderke, Luiz, and de Kadt (2004) make a similar argument in the 
case of South Africa.  They argue that “what really matters is not the [social] cleavage, but that it [the cleavage] 
comes to serve as a political tool in distributional conflict” (Fedderke et al 2004: 19).  Collier (2000a) finds that 
ethnicity has negative effects only in bad political environment (with limited political rights) but has not link with 
conflict in democracies.  Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) argue that diversity (including ethnic diversity) may actually 
increase productivity trough diversity of skills and innovative abilities. 
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During the republic era, leaders perpetuated patrimonialism by actively engineering institutions 
and mechanisms of exclusion and repression, including the use of force and intimidation against 
those who were suspected of not adhering to state ideology.  The regimes also used ideology and 
propaganda mainly through the party UPRONA (Unité pour le Progrès National), which was 
instituted into a unique party during the first military regime (1966-76).  The unique party played 
the same role as that of myth under the monarchy in brainwashing the public and promoting the 
notion of unchallenged submission to the authority.   
 
Two important features characterized the patrimonial state in Burundi: centralization and 
penetration.5  Centralization facilitated control over the economy and the political system while 
penetration extended control down to the lowest strata of the social structure.  The administration 
and party leadership from the lowest level to the top were controlled by “agents of the state” who 
were accountable to the central authority only.  Local officials were often “expatriates” from 
other communes and provinces.  Officials from the south served as administrators of communes 
in the north while the reverse was unthinkable.  This institutional engineering allowed the central 
authority to control power at all levels in the country.  The system also undermined public 
accountability on the part of government officials and allowed them to behave like the old King 
in that they were above the people and just under their “god”, that is, the central authority.   
 
The state also hijacked civil society organizations to consolidate state ideology.  Youth and 
women associations and labor unions were branches of the unique party used as propaganda 
instruments to brainwash the citizenry and enforce the supremacy of state ideology.  State 
                                                 
5 See Laely (1997) for an interesting discussion of the relationship between the centralized state and the peasantry. 
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penetration extended even to the clergy.  The Catholic Church in particular was viewed as a 
potential threat, especially due to its involvement in formal and informal education, which was 
seen as a potential vehicle for alternative ideological beliefs.  The independence of the church 
was nevertheless compromised by the presence of influential clergymen from the South who 
often served as arms of the state.  The state often was able to take advantage of the trust enjoyed 
by clergymen vis-à-vis the people to extract valuable information from or even influence 
cooperative behavior of potential opposition leaders.6   
 
While the patrimonial system was effective in repressing potential dissidence it nevertheless 
sowed the seeds of conflict by perpetuating alienation among the majority of the population, 
namely the Hutu and the non-southern Tutsi.  Because discrimination had operated along ethnic 
lines, it is not surprising that the subsequent conflicts had an ethnic dimension.   
 
The regional dimension has generally been overlooked in the analysis of conflicts in Burundi.  
Integrating the regional dimension allows us to understand why and how ethnicity is not a 
deterministic factor of conflict in Burundi (see Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000, 2003; Ndikumana 
1998).  Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003: 384) put it as follows: “Like the ethnic factor, 
regionalism appears as a tool which has been instrumented for rent-seeking, the root cause of 
civil wars in Burundi.  Ethnic and regional factors complement each other to shape rent 
collection and sharing, and none of them can explain violence alone7.”  Both ethnicity and 
regionalism are related to conflict only because they are dimensions along which power and 
                                                 
6 For example, the very influential Bishop of the Diocese of Bururi, Bernard Bududira, was an important advisor to 
military presidents who often used the clergyman’s position to gain access to opposition leaders. 
7 My emphasis. 
 10
resources have been concentrated and monopolized.  They are not deterministic factors of 
conflict in and by themselves. 
 
The post-independence regimes established true “predatory bureaucracies” (Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza 2003; Ngaruko 2003) aimed at channeling wealth to the benefit of the Tutsi-Hima 
elite from the south.  Various mechanisms allowed the minority southern elite to gain control 
over the economy.  One of these mechanisms is through excessive regulation in the economic 
system.  Excessive regulation allowed leaders to extract rents through bribes and other forms of 
corruption.  Corruption can be decomposed as follows:8 
Corruption = Discretion + Monopoly – Accountability + Hysteresis 
Discretion refers to the power of the state to influence the markets, mainly through regulation 
and expanded public procurement, which creates opportunities for “commercialization” of the 
law through bribery and obstruction of trade through extortion.  Monopoly refers to exclusive 
control over the economy by the government and the political elite, which, coupled with 
monopolization of political power by ethno-regional entities, increases the discretionary power 
of leaders, creates an “economy of solidarity”, and promotes the “politics of the belly.”9   
 
Lack of accountability is a consequence of high centralization and concentration of political and 
economic power and it is a self-perpetuating process.  As Collier (2000b: 197) points out, “once 
a society becomes corrupt there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt.”  Due to 
monopolization of state institutions, corruption became the norm in public management, then 
                                                 
8 The last term of the above expression ‘hysteresis’ is from Collier (2000b) while the other terms are from Klitgaard 
(1988). 
9 The expression “politics of the belly” is borrowed from Bayart (1993). 
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corruption became “expected”, and in the end corruption became a self-perpetuating process.10  
Corruption is vertically and downward contagious, which takes away not only administrative 
accountability, but also moral guilt.11 
 
Excessive regulation serves as a barrier to entry into the private sector for actors who are not 
politically connected.  It is not surprising that a substantial proportion of those who own large 
private companies in Burundi are former high ranking government officials or their relatives 
(Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003).  Concentration of economic power is therefore a result of 
concentration of political power. 
 
Another mechanism of redistributive politics is through the management of the public sector.  
Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000: 386) find that in 1996, the assets of the 37 fully state-controlled 
firms represented 48% of the country’s GDP.  For all parastatals combined, the ratio was a 
staggering 77%.  The parastatal sector constituted a channel of distribution of wealth to members 
of the southern Tutsi minority.  Moreover, the policy of expansion of the public sector suffocated 
the private sector while diverting scarce public funds away from socially productive investments.  
Since only a select few had access to jobs and command positions in the parastatal sector, such a 
policy increased inequality along ethnic and regional lines.   
 
                                                 
10 Honest behavior (and assiduity at work) by a new public manager is often regarded as evidence of “inexperience” 
and excessive zealousness, or “amavamuhira” (literally meaning “the energy of someone coming freshly from 
home”).  The idea is that once acclimated, a new public manager will “join the club” and start shirking his/her duties 
while filling his/her private purse using public resources. 
11 In Burundi, the code of wisdom in public service is: “impene irisha aho iziritse” (“a goat grazes wherever it is tied 
in the prairie”) or “nta mbwa ikugana igufa mu kanwa” (“no dog barks with a piece of bone in its mouth”).  The 
message is that it is acceptable (expected) to be corrupt under the blessing of a corrupt leader. 
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From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that institutional failure constitutes an important cause 
of conflict in Burundi (Ndikumana 1998).  The Burundian state has failed to perform its usual 
functions of enforcing the rule of law, protecting individual and property rights, enforcing the 
rules of fair social exchange, administering justice for all, and redistributing national wealth.  
Institutional failure created a divorce between the privatized state and the population while 
perpetuating a culture of impunity as well as incentives to capture the state for personal interests.  
However, although institutions failed, they have proved resilient to change.  Consequently, 
institutional failure has created an environment that not only predisposed the country to conflict 
but also contributed to the reoccurrence of conflicts. Ndikumana (1998) discusses this argument 
in detail. 
 
Greed and grievance  
The “greed and grievance” models of civil wars, which emphasize the motives and costs of 
organizing and maintaining rebellions, have been used to explain conflicts in African countries 
and around the world (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2002).12  Applying the Collier-Hoeffler 
model (henceforth C-H model) to the case of Burundi yields important insights into the causes of 
conflict (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003).  The model predicts correctly that Burundi is more 
prone to conflict than the average country in the sample (see Tables 3 and 4).  The results of the 
C-H model indicate that the average probability of a new war over the 1960-95 period is 26 
percent for Burundi compared to about 7 percent for the sample.   
 
 
                                                 
12 Also see Grossman (1999) and Horowitz (1995) for a discussion of the greed and grievance model of conflicts.  
See Fearon (2004) and De Soysa (2002) for an evaluation of the greed theory of civil war with regard to the role of 
primary commodities exports for conflict. 
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Table 3: Predictions of the greed and grievance model for Burundi 
 
Factor of conflict Does the factor 
increase or 
decrease risk? 
Does the factor make 
Burundi safer or riskier 
compared to the sample 
average?* 
Comments 
Secondary male 
education 
 
Decreases risk Makes Burundi riskier Consistent 
Income  Decreases risk Makes Burundi riskier Consistent 
Growth  Decreases risk Makes Burundi riskier Consistent 
Primary exports Increases risk Makes Burundi riskier Primary commodities = 
agricultural products 
Social 
fractionalization 
Decreases risk Makes Burundi safer Problematic: incorrectly 
measured; does not account 
for the political dimension 
of ethnicity 
Ethnic dominance Increases risk Makes Burundi safer Miscoded: Burundi has a 
dominant ethnic group, 
making it riskier 
Peace duration Decreases risk Makes Burundi riskier 
1975-94; safer in 1960-
74 
Incorrectly measured; e.g., 
1965 conflict not recorded 
Population  
 
Increases risk Same as average -- 
Geographic 
dispersion of the 
population 
Decreases risk Makes Burundi riskier May explain duration of 
conflicts 
* Note: Assessment based on the average value of the regressor for Burundi compared to the 
average value of the regressor for the C-H sample. 
 
However, the C-H model, like other models derived from to cross-country studies in general, has 
important limitations in explaining wars in Burundi on any given individual country.13  The 
performance of the model is compromised by the inadequate quality of the data for some 
important factors of conflict, especially ethno-linguistic fractionalization and ethnic 
dominance.14  The index of ethnic dominance used in the C-H data is problematic.  First the data 
set codes Burundi as not having a dominant ethnic group, which is inconsistent with the fact that 
                                                 
13 See Ndikumana and Emizet (2003) for a discussion of the application of the CH model on the case of the Congo. 
14 See Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) for a detailed discussion of measurement errors in the C-H data. 
 14
the Hutu represent a large proportion of the population (about 85%).  Changing the dummy of 
ethnic dominance from 0 to 1, all else being constant, increases the probability of war 
substantially (Table 4).  This is consistent with Collier’s argument that dominance, rather than 
“fractionalization” is the driving factor for conflict (Collier 2001). 
Table 4: Predicted probabilities of conflict in Burundi: ethnicity and peace duration 
 
year 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Collier-Hoeffler 0.362 0.255 0.205 0.223 0.232 0.263
Ngaruko-Nkurunziza* 0.630 0.470 0.250 0.280 0.290 0.320
Peace variable 
   modified 
0.408 0.380 0.162 0.178 0.195 0.248
Ethnic dominance = 1 0.479 0.356 0.294 0.317 0.328 0.366
Peace modified and 
  ethnic dominance = 1 
0.527 0.498 0.238 0.259 0.281 0.348
Ethnic groups = 3 0.304 0.208 0.170 0.191 0.198 0.227
Ethno-regional groups 
   = 5 
0.261 0.175 0.145 0.167 0.174 0.199
Ethnic dominance =1  
  and ethnic groups = 3 
0.414 0.298 0.249 0.277 0.286 0.321
Ethnic dominance = 1, 3 ethnic 
groups, and peace modified 
0.461 0.433 0.199 0.223 0.243 0.304
Notes: The probabilities are based on the Collier-Hoeffler “alternative” model which includes as regressors the log 
and growth rate of GDP per capita, the level and square of the share of primary commodities exports, social 
fractionalization, ethnic dominance, peace duration, the log of population, and geographic dispersion of the 
population.   
* Note: Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) modify the peace variable as well as the social fractionalization index by 
considering 3 ethnic groups.   
 
In the context of Burundi, the quantitative treatment of ethnic fractionalization is problematic 
because the quantitative measure does not account for the political significance of ethnicity.  
Although the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa speak the same language, over time they became politically 
distinguishable communities, especially starting from 1929 when the colonial administration 
engineered the domination of the Tutsi in the administration.  Taking this view that the 
differences among the three groups are indeed relevant for conflict, Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 
(2003) recalculated the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization by taking into account the 
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relative proportions of each group (85%, 14%, and 1% for the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa, 
respectively).  This yields a value of 26 for the index (instead of 4 as in the C-H data set). 
 
In addition to ethnicity, regionalism has also been an important dimension of fractionalization 
and antagonism in the political system.  Burundian politics in the 1960s were marked by sharp 
antagonism between the Tutsi monarchists of Muramvya and the Tutsi from Bururi.  The post-
independence military regimes dominated by the southern Tutsi systematically sought to limit 
Muramvya’s political influence.  There are also regionalist tensions within the Hutu ethnic group 
as non-southern Hutu feel that the Hutu from the south have benefited from “neighborhood 
effects” and have been less marginalized than the Hutu from the rest of the country. 
 
Given these considerations, it is more appropriate to think of ethno-regional fractionalization 
rather than ethnic fractionalization.  Two implications follow.  First, fractionalization becomes a 
dynamic phenomenon rather than a fixed factor, which helps to better explain the pattern and 
timing of civil wars over time.  Second, considering ethno-regional entities increases measured 
fractionalization and contrary to the theory’s prediction, higher fractionalization makes Burundi 
more, not less vulnerable to conflict.  To keep the argument simple, we focus on the most recent 
war.  First, one of the reasons why the war broke out in 1993 is because the monolithic army and 
the southern Tutsi elite were unwilling to accept the shift in power concentration away from the 
South.  President Ndadaye was the first president to be a Hutu, a non-southern, and a civilian.  
Second, the war has lasted longer because it has been fought on several fronts, not just opposing 
the Hutu against the Tutsi/  For example, the non-southern Tutsi and Hutu have accused the 
southern Tutsi and Hutu leadership of shielding the south from the killings while allowing 
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destruction of the rest of the country.  Non-southern Tutsi have discovered that not all Tutsi are 
created equal, and that certainly a monolithic military is not an insurance for any ethnic group.  
As the war progressed, ethnic affinity eroded in both camps.  It will be harder in the future for 
divisionist leaders to simply ride on the back of ethnicity as a way of mobilizing political 
support. 
 
3. Distributional conflict 
This section explains how the various wars in Burundi arise from distributional conflict and 
illustrates the argument with an analysis of two of the main dimensions of the institutional 
apparatus that formed the foundation of the politics of exclusion, namely education and the 
military.  We then identify key factors of each past war that make it a distributional conflict. 
 
Education and distributional conflict 
The goal of the education system is the development of human capital, which is achieved by 
pursuing two objectives within the limits of the resource constraint: (1) achieving the highest 
enrollment ratios or mass literacy and (2) providing the highest quality of education or 
sophistication.  For a monolithic regime, mass literacy is perceived as a threat because it 
increases the demand for political participation and economic equity.  So, mass literacy yields 
disutility for the dominant group even though it increases welfare for society as a whole.  As a 
result, monolithic regimes tend to under-invest in mass education and concentrate resources to 
providing the best education to the privileged few.   
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To formalize the idea, let H be the amount of education or human capital accumulation produced 
through education.  We assume that the society’s utility function is separable into the utility of 
the dominant group (D) and the utility of the rest of the population (P).  The weight attached to 
each component depends on the political power of each group.  The function can be written as 
follows: 
),()1(),()( DPPPDD HHUHHUHU γγ −+=     (1) 
where γ  is a measure of the political power of the dominant group. 
There are two possible ways of characterizing the optimization process.  First, given the 
antagonism between the dominant group and the rest of population, each group’s utility is 
increasing in its own human capital but decreasing in the rival group’s human capital.  That is, 
for the dominant group, less education of the rest of the population is preferred because more 
mass education may result in higher pressure for power sharing.  For the rest of the population 
more education for the dominant group implies more marginalization and an increase in the 
political power of the dominant group.  Therefore, the utility function has the following 
properties:  
PDiUU i HH
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Since the dominant group has control over the allocation of public resources, it can effectively 
influence education for the rest of the population.  In contrast, the rest of the population has little 
influence on the allocation of resources, which provides incentives to rebel against the dominant 
group.  Hence, discrimination in education is a potential vehicle for conflict. 
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A second way of formalizing the outcomes of discrimination in education is to include the two 
objectives of education (mass literacy L and sophistication S) explicitly in the utility function.  
Thus the utility function is written as follows: 
),()1(),(),( SLUSLUSLUU PD γγ −+==      (4) 
Since the ruling elite prefer sophistication over literacy while the population prefers literacy, it 
follows that:  
L
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U DD
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∂       (5) 
 
These asymmetries in preferences affect the allocation of resources for any given production 
technology (production of human capital).  For a given amount of national resources allocated to 
education, the dominant group will tend to “produce” more sophistication than literacy (point B 
in Figure 2) while the rest of the population will prefer to “produce” more literacy than 
sophistication (like in Point A).  When the imbalance of power is high, that is, with a high value 
of γ , the equilibrium combination of sophistication and literacy will be closer to point B than 
point A in Figure 2.  That is, fewer people will be educated than is potentially feasible given 
national resources even though those who do access education will receive a higher quality 
education simply because resources are devoted to a smaller pool of recipients.  The society as a 
whole will be worse off when elitism dominates literacy as an objective of the education system, 
which is the most likely outcome in the presence of high inequality in political power. 
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The socially optimal allocation of resources is somewhere between point A and point B in Figure 
2, where a sustainable balance between mass literacy and intellectual sophistication is achieved.  
In principle, social bargaining between the dominant group and the majority of the population 
could induce each group to move towards the “middle”.  The problem is that the dominant group 
feels threatened by mass literacy because literacy increases competition in the political and 
economic spheres.  A “gift exchange” mechanism can in principle motivate the migration toward 
the “middle”.  For the elite, the cost of moving towards the middle is a loss in relative power.  
However, point B is socially unsustainable in the long term due to alienation and frustration 
among the excluded population.  While increasing access to education for the majority of the 
population yields stability, the dominant group’s desire to preserve political power induces it to 
depress literacy.  This largely explains why the southern Tutsi elite in Burundi maintained a 
discriminatory education system as a tool of power consolidation. 
 
The military and distributional conflict 
Figure 2: Literacy vs. elitist education
A: low γ  
B: high γ  
Literacy 
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The military, especially its structure and its links to politics, must be at the center of any 
objective analysis of post-independence conflicts in Burundi from a distributional-conflict 
perspective.  The contribution of the military in generating distributional conflict arises from (1) 
its structure, (2) what it provides to those who have access to it, and (3) what it represents for 
those who are excluded from it.  Furthermore, the role of the military is closely connected with 
state legitimacy, which also has important implications for resource allocation and political 
instability. 
 
The structure of the military in Burundi changed dramatically in 1965.  Following the aborted 
coup by members of the Hutu elite, the government orchestrated systematic cleansing of the 
Hutu in the military and the civilian elite (Ntibazonkiza 1993).  From that point on, the military 
became largely monolithic.  The Micombero regime (1966-1976) initiated systematic 
discrimination against non-southern Tutsi and the military became a monopoly under the control 
of the southern Tutsi-Hima elite. 
 
For the southern Tutsi-Hima elite, the military provided a source of rent in the form of political 
power, a source of employment, and an avenue to other material advantages from the military 
coup by Micombero in 1966 until the establishment of the transitional government in 2001.15  
Because of the monopolization of the military by the southern Tutsi elite and its role a guarantor 
of political power, public expenditures have systematically been skewed in favor of security to 
the disadvantage of socially productive investments such as infrastructure, education, and health 
(Figure 3).  The bias in the allocation of public resources in favor of security is closely connected 
                                                 
15 Even under the FRODEBU regime of Ntibantunganya from 1993 to 1996, the army had de facto control of power.  
The government was kept hostage and paralyzed, which prevented it from implementing any policies that may 
adversely affect the interests of the military and its civilian allies. 
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to state legitimacy (Ndikumana 2004a).  A state that lacks legitimacy invests in security in order 
to repress demands for political opening.  This fiscal policy orientation increases the 
marginalization of the disenfranchised majority while it promotes rent extraction by the elite in 
power, which increases the risk of conflict.   
Figure 3: Expenditures on education and the military
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The conflicts of 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993-ongoing as distributional conflicts 
To summarize our analysis of the causes of conflict in Burundi, we highlight key direct and 
underlying causes of the various civil wars with the purpose of identifying factors that show that 
these wars arise from distributional conflict (Table 5). 
 
The 1965 killings 
 
The assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe in January 1965 and the 
refusal by the King to appoint a Hutu as prime minister despite the landslide victory by Hutu 
deputies in the May 1965 legislative elections created political upheaval and poisoned the 
relations between the Hutu and Tutsi political elite on the one hand and between the King and 
the civilian elite on the other hand.  The events demonstrated that the monarch and the elite Tutsi 
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were not ready to share power.  Furthermore, the Tutsi elite were afraid of a possible repetition 
of the bloody overthrow of the King by the Hutu in neighboring Rwanda in 1959.  The events in 
Rwanda were used to cultivate fear among the Tutsi of an impending danger of extermination in 
the event of control of power by the Hutu majority.  The alleged coup plot by the Hutu against 
the King gave the Tutsi the opportunity to decapitate the Hutu civilian and military leadership. 
The 1972 massacres 
 
The overthrow of the monarchy by army officer Micombero in 1966 intensified accentuated the 
tensions between the Tutsi from Muramvya (the former royal headquarters) and those from 
Bururi.  In 1971, rumors of a possible reestablishment of the monarchy, the return of Prince 
Ndizeye and his assassination by the army deepened the tensions further.  An alleged coup plot 
by the Hutu accelerated the descent into chaos.  The southern Tutsi elite took advantage of this 
chaos to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Hutu from the military and the civil service that 
had started in 1965.  The regime also ceased the opportunity to sideline the Tutsi from 
Muramvya and the rest of the country.  The 1972 war was indeed a distributional conflict in that 
the southern Tutsi elite opted for the “final solution” to consolidate their hold on power by 
eliminating the Hutu elite. 
 
The 1988 conflict 
In August 1988, the country experienced a civil war in the northern provinces of Ngozi and 
Kirundo following a long truce of 16 years.  What makes the 1988 conflict a distributional 
conflict is the role played by state penetration and the resistance to it by the Hutu population.  In 
the periods leading to the outbreak of the conflict, the government had been warned of tensions 
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in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Muyinga between local administrators and the 
population.  One major area of contention was that these “expatriate” local administrators from 
the south were arrogant and insensitive to the needs of the local community.  Moreover, the 
“wind from the East”, that is, the international drive for democratization energized by the fall of 
the Communist block, also contributed to the intensification of mobilization activities by 
clandestine Hutu opposition movements.   
Table 5: Elements of distributional conflict in Burundi’s civil wars  
 
Civil wars Deaths and refugees Aspects of distributional conflict 
October-
November 1965 
- Deaths: 5,000 
(Hutu) 
- Refugees: 
negligible 
- Prime Minister Ngendadumwe assassinated 
- The King refuses to appoint a Hutu as prime minister 
- Rwanda’s Hutu “revolution” of 1959 
   
April – July 
1972 
- Deaths: 200,000 
(mostly Hutu) 
- Refugees: 300,000 
(Hutu) 
- Bururi-Muramvya antagonism; suspicions of return of the monarchy 
- Consolidation of Bururi Tutsi-Hima domination (started in 1966) 
- Ethnic cleansing of the military (started in 1965) 
   
August 1988 - Deaths: 15,000 
(Hutu and Tutsi) 
- Refugees: 50,000 
(Hutu) 
- State penetration: “expatriate” local administrators 
- “Vent d’Est” (wind of democratic change from the former communist 
block). 
- 18 years of formation of Hutu intelligentsia at home (though 
constrained) and abroad: a threat to the regime and an opportunity for 
change. 
   
November 1991 - Deaths: 1-3,000 
(Hutu) 
- Refugees: 38,000 
(Hutu) 
- Intensification of Hutu opposition (armed and unarmed opposition) 
   
October 1993-
ongoing 
- Deaths: >300,000 
(majority Hutu) 
- Refugees: 700,000 
(Hutu) 
- President Ndadaye declares intension to reform the military: threat to 
the foundations of power. 
- Rapid dismissal of former government officials: vanishing rent base 
- Return of Hutu refugees: threat to “biens mal acquis” (looted 
property). 
-Scrutiny of business practices (e.g., the case of AFRIMET gold 
mining company): threat to rent base 
Source: The death toll and number of refugees are from Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) who compiled the statistics 
from UNHCR data. 
 
It is important to note that from 1972 to 1988, the country had not experienced any violent 
conflict.  While this allowed the military regimes to consolidate power, it also allowed the 
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rebuilding of a sizeable Hutu intelligentsia abroad and at home.  As the Hutu intelligentsia 
expanded, domestic demand for power sharing increased.  This explains the increase in the 
intensity of the activities of opposition groups but also the response of the Hutu to repression 
after the outbreak of the civil war in the north.  Fearing a repetition of the 1972 massacres, the 
Hutu intelligentsia decided to challenge the government openly.  In a near-heroic move, a group 
of Hutu intellectuals wrote an open letter to the President (1) to condemn indiscriminate and 
arbitrary arrests and execution of Hutu intellectuals and (2) to demand a national debate on 
ethnic discrimination and reform of the political system to achieve egalitarian representation.  
The open letter marked a turning point in the history of conflict in Burundi: the intelligentsia had 
decided to no longer watch passively as the government security forces slaughter the people as it 
had happened in the past.  They decided to not only confront the government but to also expose 
the tragedy to the international community.  These reactions by the Hutu intelligentsia largely 
explain why the repression was less widespread and shorter than in 1972.  These reactions of the 
Hutu intellectuals along with external pressure on the regime were instrumental in the initiation 
of the process of political opening, starting with the formation of an ethnically balanced 
“government of unity” in 1989, the opening of a national debate on ethnic divisions, and the 
ensuing opening of the political process that would eventually culminate into democratic 
elections in 1993. 
 
The 1991 rebellion 
The invasion by Hutu rebels in November 1991 may be linked to the general dissatisfaction of 
Hutu opposition groups with regard to the nature and pace of the political liberalization process 
initiated in 1989.  These groups accused the government of managing the process to preserve the 
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control of power by the southern Tutsi-Hima.  The rebellion demonstrated that cosmetic changes 
such as having more Hutu in top government positions were not enough to satisfy the opposition 
which demanded more sharing in the instruments of power, especially the military.  The 1991 
events demonstrated also that the Hutu rebellion had changed tactics, opting to confront the 
military head on.   
 
The 1993-ongoing war 
The ongoing war that started in 1993 following the assassination of President Ndadaye is by far 
the most vivid illustration of distributional conflict.  Four key factors that illustrate how this war 
is a distributional conflict.  First, President Ndadaye announced his intention to reform the 
military to make it more representative of the ethnic and regional makeup of the society, as part 
of his plan to build what he called a Burundi Nouveau (New Burundi).  Throughout the period of 
transition toward democracy which started in 1989, the military had systematically exhibited 
strong opposition to relinquishing power.  Secondly, the Ndadaye regime quickly proceeded to 
replace former government officials in a drive to establish control of power but also to fulfill 
campaign promises.  For outgoing government officials and their allies in the private sector, 
these reforms meant the loss of the means of extracting rents, which explains the wide support 
that the military coup received among the Tutsi civilian elite. 
 
Third, the massive return of Hutu refugees and their demand for jobs and retribution of heir land 
and other property constituted a major threat for members of the Tutsi ethnic group who had 
appropriated the property of the Hutu who fled the country.  Reparation and retribution had never 
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crossed the minds of the many Tutsi who had enriched themselves from looting the property of 
orphans and widows of their Hutu neighbors.   
 
Fourth, the Ndadaye government was also a threat to the Tutsi business sector.  As discussed 
throughout this paper, under the patrimonial regimes, connections with the government were 
essential for success in the business sector.  These advantages were to evaporate with the 
institution of a broad-based government.   
 
The nature of the war on the ground and its duration also demonstrate its character as a 
distributional conflict rather than just a Hutu-Tutsi conflict.  The multiplicity of belligerents 
demonstrates that political rivalry matters probably as much as – if not more than – ethnic 
rivalry.  Political parties and rebel groups have split up as leaders fail to agree on mechanisms for 
rent sharing.   
 
4. Making peace work: Strategies for post-conflict reconstruction 
The political problem 
As we have argued throughout this paper, a correct diagnosis of the conflict in Burundi must 
acknowledge the centrality of the political problem, namely the issue of balance of power 
between ethnic groups and regions.  To achieve lasting peace, the country’s leaders must find 
strategies to overcome the legacies of political imbalance.  We emphasize three dimensions of 
the political problem: the military, ethno-regional balance, and the constitutional process and 
independence of the judiciary. 
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Building lasting peace will require transformation of the military for the purpose of making it an 
a-political institution.  The accord signed in November 2003 between the transitional 
government of Burundi (TGB) and the CNDD-FDD for a ceasefire and mechanisms for 
organization of the new national defense was a history-making event.  The agreement envisages 
the formation of a defense force that is balanced at all level.  The restructuring process has 
already commenced but a few issues remain.  The first issue is that the accord does not include 
the Front National de Liberation (FNL, National Liberation Front) as this group has refused to 
take part into the negotiations.  Any progress in the peace process means further marginalization 
of this group.  The problem is that the FNL still has the capacity to disturb peace even though it 
has no chance of withstanding an open confrontation with the restructured national defense force.  
For the sake of peace stability it is vital to find ways of convincing if not forcing the FNL to put 
down its arms and take part in the new democratic process. 
 
The second critical question is that of sustainability of the army.  Attempts to accommodating all 
the political tendencies would result in an unsustainable size of the military.  This means that a 
large proportion of the regular army and the rebel forces needs to be demobilized and integrated 
into civilian life.  This especially concerns the estimated fourteen thousand child soldiers in the 
rebel forces (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2003).  Downsizing the army is a politically sensitive 
enterprise and it can pose a security threat if it is not executed.  The country will need significant 
financial and technical assistance from the international community to manage the reform of the 
army and to finance the demobilization of former combatants. 
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The analysis of the causes of the conflicts in this paper implies that the process of peace building 
needs to take into account both ethnicity and regional balance in the design of new institutions.  
However, representation should not be reduced to mechanical quotas based on the demographic 
size of ethnic groups.  The objective is to protect the interests of both the majority as well as the 
minority groups. 
 
The challenge in the post-conflict period will be to establish agencies of restraint that transcend 
political cycles.  These agencies are mainly the Constitution and the legal system.  The legal 
system has always been partisan and served as an integral part of the military regime’s repressive 
apparatus.  The Constitution has had little meaning due to the universal veto power of the 
President.  Consolidation of peace will require independence of these agencies of restraint.  In 
particular, the leadership of these agencies should be either elected directly or confirmed by 
representative bodies.   
 
The economic problem 
Building lasting peace requires solving a certain number of critical economic problems facing 
the country.  Some of these problems are part of the causes of conflict while others are a result of 
the conflict.  But even those economic problems that may seem unrelated to conflict need to be 
addressed to ameliorate the standards of living of the population and overcome poverty.  Poverty 
may not cause conflict, but a solid economy is essential for political stability and peace 
consolidation.  Poverty produces two effects that are detrimental to peace building.  First, 
poverty erodes the relationship between the people and the state.  A state that is economically 
impotent is unable to perform its other essential non-economic roles, including enforcing the rule 
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of law.  Second, poverty increases the temptation for using the state as a source of wealth 
accumulation.  When the returns to investment in politics exceed the returns to labor and capital 
in the private sector, agents tend to channel energy and resources towards capturing the state, 
which inevitably creates instability and leads to conflict.  Consequently, economic performance 
is a vital ingredient for building lasting peace.   
 
Even as the country struggles to finance its immense reconstruction needs, its limited resources 
are drained by debt service.  In 2003, Burundi spent 65.8 percent of its exports revenues on debt 
service, up from 39.3 percent in 2000.  By comparison the government spent $3 per capita on 
health care in 2001, but paid $5 per capita on servicing debt owed to official creditors alone.  
Even as debt accumulated, less funds stayed in the country while large proportion of the 
resources were transferred abroad (Figure 4).  Official development aid and other forms of 
official assistance dried out since the start of the 1993 conflict.  The best way for the 
international community to help Burundi achieve lasting peace is to write off its debts and to 
increase official development aid to finance economic recovery.16  Debt write offs and new aid 
obviously should be conditional on commitment to democratic governance by the new 
leadership.  In particular, implementation of the Arusha and Pretoria accords should be a key 
criterion for aid disbursement.  Pressure for debt write-offs for post-conflict reconstruction has 
gained momentum with the United States’ pressure for cancellation of Iraqi’s debt on the basis of 
the odious debt doctrine.  Obviously the same argument applies to the majority of developing 
countries, including Burundi.17  The population of these countries should not bear the burden of 
                                                 
16 In Ndikumana (2004b), we argue that debt relief alone will not be enough to help developing countries “graduate” 
from aid dependence.  Debt relief should be accompanied by increases in aid to allow developing countries to grow 
faster and increase their rates of saving and investment. 
17 See Boyce and Ndikumana (2003a; 2003b) for a detailed discussion of the odious debt argument. 
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debts that were used to finance regimes that oppressed them.  The recent decision by the G8 
government to write off more debt for HIPC countries is a promising sign.  However, more needs 
to be done to enlarge to pool of relief recipients and to establish mechanisms that prevent new 
cycles of debt crises. 
Figure 4: Burundi: Debt indicators and ODA (million US $)
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Education 
In the post-conflict era, education policy has to pursue two objectives that are equally important 
for peace building: increase the efficiency in resource allocation to maximize human capital 
formation and promote equity in access to education across ethnic groups and regions.  We 
emphasize two strategies that could help in this transformation of the education system.  The first 
strategy is to design and implement a financial aid scheme for college education.  Since recently, 
there has been an expansion in private higher education in the country, which has contributed to 
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alleviating pressure on the public university.  However, private universities are expensive and the 
majority of the population cannot afford them.  Moreover, nowhere in the world has any country 
been able to establish a solid higher education system without a network of first class public 
universities.  With the support of the development assistance community, the government needs 
to establish a subsidized loan program that allows all academically qualifying students to afford 
education.  The government will need to design mechanisms that allow maximum repayment of 
student loans to ensure sustainability of the program.  The second policy is to increase the 
decentralization of secondary education by increasing subsidies to district high schools (collèges 
communaux).  Foreign assistance to education should consider the two objectives of reform of 
the education system as central to decisions regarding allocation and disbursement of 
development assistance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have argued that unequal distribution of national wealth and monopolization of power are the 
primary causes of civil wars in Burundi.  Civil wars do not just happen; even the existence of 
potentially antagonistic groups need not generate conflicts.  Civil wars are the result of 
discrimination and exclusion, which in the case of Burundi operated not only along ethnic lines 
but also regional lines.  Moreover, just as conflicts do not just arise, they need not reoccur.  
Conflicts will restart when their root causes are not addressed.  These root causes need to be 
addressed by implementing economic policies and institutional reforms aimed at achieving 
equity in access to power and national resources.  The overriding goal of these reforms should be 
the protection of the rights of all groups, minorities as well as majorities.  
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While the new Burundian leadership bears the burden of crafting and implementing political and 
economic reforms, the international community also has a critical role to play for the success of 
these reforms.  Given the long history of patrimonialism, certain interest groups may invest in 
protecting the privileges acquired under the old regimes and sabotage the reforms.  The 
experience of 1993 with the assassination of the democratically elected president demonstrated 
that this legacy of patrimonialism is a serious constraint to policy reform.  The international 
community can use its leverage through financial aid as well as military intervention to contain 
such sectarian tendencies on all sides.   
 
The international community should also assist in financing peace building and economic 
recovery.  However, politically blind interventions are detrimental to peace building.  The 
development assistance community should scrutinize the distributional impacts of foreign aid.  
For example, aid to education can play a critical role in helping the country to correct the effects 
of the legacy of exclusion.  In particular, the country would benefit immensely from aid 
channeled to funding complete decentralization of high school education and a student loan 
program for tertiary education.  Such an orientation of aid to education would serve to alleviate 
the pressure on the government budget and contribute to equalization of educational 
opportunities across ethnic groups and regions. 
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